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Page iExecutive Summary
executive summary
This study is a continuation of earlier CAE
analyses of the New Zealand energy situation,
and the issues surrounding primary energy
supply in particular. The study offers a compre-
hensive discussion of the risks New Zealand
faces in the post-Maui era, especially with
regards to the supply and consumption of gas.
The premise of the report is that gas explora-
tion in New Zealand in recent years has
declined due to the large reserves and the low
cost of gas from the Maui field. As Maui comes
to the end of its productive life, the imbalance
between gas demand and gas supply will
intensify.
The key distinction between the Maui era and
the present is that proven developed gas
reserves are now low relative to the rate of
consumption. We argue that New Zealand
needs to find thermal energy solutions that can
balance energy security against higher costs
while achieving energy diversity through
planned investment in alternative strategies.
The inherent difficulty faced by the New
Zealand energy market is one of scale; in a
small market the likelihood for market domi-
nance by one thermal fuel is high. For major
energy users the future price of gas will be
critical. Higher costs will also adversely impact
on the competitiveness of the primary produc-
tion and processing sectors and hence on the
economy as a whole.
The purpose of this investigation, therefore,
has been to inform government policies and
industry strategies on the implications of
various supply options and the public policy
imperatives that are needed to underpin future
planning and investment. To achieve this, the
report seeks to develop a clear understanding
of the primary technical, economic, and
transactional requirements that might frame
future decision-making. In particular this study
seeks to provide an analysis of:
• The state of the New Zealand thermal fuels
market.
• How the indigenous natural gas sector
might develop to meet domestic demand
during the transition to “new” thermal fuels
post-Maui.
• How other thermal fuels may be used to
supplement indigenous gas supply to meet
any supply gap and enhance security.
• How these options may be deployed
should indigenous gas supply prove
inadequate.
• The possible effects of “high assurance
solutions,” such as conventional LNG
implementation, on the vitality of explora-
tion and development.
• The optimal energy supplies strategy that
balances risks and opportunities for the
New Zealand economy.
Due to low prices for gas during the Maui era,
New Zealand gas exploration efforts were
insufficient to maintain adequate reserves and
allow an ordered market response to the
depletion of the Maui field . Today, New
Zealand’s gas reserves represent just nine years
of production.  Depending on the assumptions
used for demand, this could extend for another
five years. New, as yet undiscovered, reserves
will be needed early in the next decade.
However, with increasing gas prices the
incentives for gas exploration have dramatically
improved. New Zealand thus has a window of
opportunity of some few years before any
decision needs to be made on the next tranche
of fuel supply. The fundamentals for further gas
exploration success are good and, with a
higher level of exploration activity, there are
good prospects for restoring New Zealand’s gas
inventory to a level that would improve energy
supply security and give energy markets a
higher level of certainty.
The alternative is to supplement a dwindling
indigenous natural gas supply with thermal
fuels from other sources.
An LNG project to meet an annual gas gap of
about 80 PJ a year is at the lower end of the
minimum economic scale in a capital-intensive
industry. Such a scale is large as a proportion
of the whole New Zealand gas market, but is
only 0.2% of current world LNG trade. The
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most likely contract structure would involve a
long-term commitment to this volume of gas,
thereby reducing the size of the market
available to indigenous suppliers.
A storage and re-gasification facility of this
scale is estimated to cost approximately
US$280 million plus infrastructure costs of
between US$60m and US$90m. Assuming an
FoB price of around US$3.30/GJ at a prevailing
oil price of US$30/barrel, and with a shipping
tariff of around US$0.33/GJ, and an exchange
rate of NZ$1 = US 55 cents, the indicative cost
of LNG delivered into New Zealand is expected
to be in the region of $8.70/GJ, The deploy-
ment of an alternative option explored in this
study of a re-gasification vessel reduces this
cost to about $8.05/GJ.
Macro-economic modelling of the New Zealand
economy under this scenario predicts that LNG
imports would cause terms of trade to worsen,
with additional exports needed to avoid an
external deficit.  It is predicted that real
exports would rise by 0.4%, pulling resources
out of private consumption which falls by
0.3%; which is around $340 million per annum
in 2004 prices.
The real cost of LNG imports in 2017 is
predicted to be $600 million. Of this about
$300m is paid for by higher exports and lower
private consumption, leaving about $300m to
be accommodated by a change in the mix of
imports. Gas prices would be higher than
indigenous fuel costs and demand for both gas
and electricity would be lower.
While there are significant uncertainties around
these projections, the commercial viability of
LNG importation into the small New Zealand
market is considered to be doubtful at present.
A premature decision to import LNG would also
act to discourage local gas exploration and
possibly coal development, primarily for scale
reasons, and would lead the country  towards
higher future energy costs and diminished
economic performance. Whilst attractive from a
security of supply perspective, an LNG option
also raises significant public policy issues.
There are alternatives deserving of more
attention.
Coal has the potential to reassert itself in the
thermal fuels market for both electricity
generation and industrial use. Resources are
well known; it can be stockpiled, is proximate
to main users and is highly tradable. Economi-
cally recoverable resources in New Zealand are
estimated at 150,000 PJ, or about 75 times
current gas reserves. At current rates of
consumption there is enough for 230 years,
excluding the vast Southland/Otago lignite
resource.
Coal also has potential economic benefits in
giving much-needed fuel diversity in electricity
generation and offers significant flexibility for a
market place that is already constrained by
seasonal demand profiles and dry-year effects
within the electricity sector.
Modelling of the electricity market shows that
the use of LNG as a fuel would result in
materially higher electricity prices than the
other main alternatives of indigenous gas and
coal. In addition, there is there is very little
difference in projected wholesale electricity
price between using coal and indigenous gas
at expected carbon charges. This exposes
another significant commercial risk for LNG,
because coal can always compete.
This investigation concludes that New Zealand
should be extremely wary about importing
high-cost fuels, which could lead to over-
dependence on one type of thermal fuel.
Security of energy supply does not require our
economy to lock into any one option. Dealing
with supply shortfall is not simply a question
of reducing risk at any price or seeking
certainty; instead, it demands responses that
will extend New Zealand’s primary energy
resource base, restore inventories to cover a
strategic reserve capacity and enable long-term
investment in alternative sources.
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Page 5Introduction
New Zealand’s energy sector has now firmly
entered a transition period between an era of
abundant gas supply since the Maui field was
developed in 1979, and a post-Maui era that
begins once the giant field is depleted some
time around 2010. Our entering this transition
was heralded by the redetermination of the
Maui gas reserves and renegotiation of the
Maui Contract.
The work reported here is a continuation of
earlier CAE published analysis of the New
Zealand energy situation, especially the issues
surrounding primary energy supply. The report
gives a comprehensive discussion of the risks
and options New Zealand faces in the post-
Maui era, and examines the various thermal
fuel supply options available. The investiga-
tions described have been sponsored by a
consortium of industry interests and the
Ministry of Economic Development.
In doing so, this study provides the first
complete and independent analysis of the
thermal fuels market in New Zealand. The new
information presented in this summary report
is underpinned by a series of technical investi-
gations, documented in a detailed project
report prepared for the sponsor group.
The purpose of the study is to inform Govern-
ment policies and industry strategies of the
balances of opportunity, cost, risks and
benefits arising from choosing certain path-
ways. To achieve this, the study seeks to
develop a clear understanding of the primary
technical, economic, contractual and regulatory
decisions required to realise the most attrac-
tive of the options available.
In particular, the study develops objective
analyses of:
• the state of New Zealand thermal fuels
markets
• how the indigenous natural gas sector
might develop to adequately meet domes-
tic demand in the transition from the Maui
era to a “new” thermal fuels supply
environment in the post-Maui era
introduction
• how other thermal fuels options such as
LNG, coal or CNG may be used to supple-
ment indigenous gas supply to plug any
supply gap and enhance energy security,
including dealing with hydro shortages in
the electricity system
• how these options may be deployed should
indigenous gas supply prove inadequate in
the longer term
• the possible effects of “high assurance”
solutions, such as a standard LNG imple-
mentation, on the vitality of exploration
and development, on the energy sector and
on the overall competitiveness of the
economy
• the optimal energy supply strategy that
balances the risks and opportunities for the
New Zealand economy.
The perspectives taken are market-based rather
than technical, and the scenario-based ap-
proach adopted is more top-down than
bottom-up. The investigation is thus primarily
at a national level, and while some commercial
issues relevant to future options are investi-
gated, the study does not aim to present
enterprise-level analysis. The effects and
infrastructure implications of various options
are assessed wherever possible in relation to
some industrial sectors, electricity generation
and prices, and the economy as a whole.
A base case examines the prospects of continu-
ing to rely on adequate supplies of indigenous
natural gas at reasonable and competitive
prices. Increasing scarcity and consequential
higher prices are currently leading to more, if
belated, exploration for oil and gas. There is a
small and urgent time window for the sector to
find and develop new indigenous gas re-
sources before alternative thermal fuels supply
options will be necessary. The feasibility of this
base case is assessed through analysis of the
undiscovered and undeveloped New Zealand
gas resource and of the potential to develop
the domestic exploration and production sector
to a level at or beyond that held during the
Maui era.
In an LNG scenario, gas importation is identi-
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fied as the counterfactual if indigenous natural
gas reserves continue to fall short of potential
consumption. Because this is a potentially
viable means of minimising the risks to
security of energy supply, whilst avoiding the
supply security  uncertainties associated with
alternative courses of action, this option and
its impacts are investigated in some detail. A
high-level characterisation is presented of the
implications of importing LNG, touching on
minimum efficient scale, the extent to which
existing infrastructure can be used or will be
stranded, new capital and infrastructure
requirements, contractual issues, planning and
lead-time issues, and the potential downstream
and economic impacts of proceeding along
these lines.
Due primarily to the scale requirements and
the relatively high capital requirements and
cost of conventional LNG projects, and the
uncertainty of indigenous gas exploration
success, other options are also examined to
improve the thermal fuels situation; either in
isolation or as a portfolio of measures. These
include opportunities for increased coal
utilisation, whether indigenous or imported,
and opportunities for importing distillate fuels
or CNG.
The time horizon for the study is the decade to
2015. Analysis extends beyond this time as it
applies to long-lived infrastructure and assets,
and to lead times in resource and project
realisation. Prices are in $NZ unless otherwise
stated.
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energy and the economy
The Maui era was characterised by strong
economic development underpinned by low
energy costs which gave the New Zealand
economy a competitive advantage in energy-
intensive activities. The economy and a large
portion of its infrastructure was tuned to major
investments that were made in association
with development of the Maui field. These led
to the establishment of natural gas as New
Zealand’s primary fuel source for new electricity
generating plant, the development of a gas
processing industry, and significant substitution
of foreign oil in the domestic fuels market. At
its peak, Maui produced a quarter of New
Zealand’s energy requirements. The country
was 65% self-sufficient in transport fuels and
had close to net self-sufficiency in oil.
However, the other side of this equation was
the failure at national level to address this
country’s future energy priorities. CAE has
previously characterised this failure as a lost
opportunity, leaving New Zealand exposed to
economic risk and the many vagaries of global
energy markets. What the post-Maui era will
bring is both troublingly, uncertain and
critically important to New Zealand’s future
economic performance.
With the impending depletion of the Maui gas
field, and little in the way of new resources to
replace it in terms of quantity and flexibility in
deliverability, New Zealand faces a transition
period of considerable energy supply uncer-
tainty as increasingly scarce natural gas
resources lead to price increases. This looming
gas shortfall has arrived while a second
transition, towards a less centralised and more
competitive electricity sector, is being worked
through.  The most important combined effect
is uncertainty over the framework within which
relevant Government policies and enterprise
strategies are developed.  This uncertainty has
in turn led to:
• delays in expansion commitments of new
generation plant required to satisfy growing
electricity demand
• Government underwriting of Genesis
Power’s e3p Huntly project
• delays in the commitment to the expansion
of primary processing industries
• loss of competitive edge in some of these
industries and signs of some industry
investment moving offshore.
Uncertainty over the commercial environment in
the energy sector makes investors insecure
which, in turn, tends to suppress investment.
If this situation persists, it threatens the energy
security of users which has flow-on effects
through the economy.
THE IMPORTANCE OF ENERGY SECURITY
New Zealand’s current position
The notion of energy security is based on
society’s expectation that an adequate and
continuous supply of energy at reasonable
prices can be maintained. The expectation is
not only for the immediate future, but also for
an orderly transition to future energy arrange-
ments that allow continuing improvements to
our quality of life through economic growth
whilst ensuring environmental impacts are at
acceptable levels.
A range of recent indicators and events suggest
that New Zealand’s energy security is rather
lower than might be desirable.  These include:
• insufficient thermal generation capacity to
cover reduced hydroelectric output during
periods of low inflows, such as in 2001 and
2003.
• urgent investment by central government in
the recommissioning of the Whirinaki power
station, on behalf of the Electricity Commis-
sion while it was still being established,
which many suggest is sub-optimal.
• the difficulties of securing necessary
investment in infrastructure modernisation
and of facilitating ongoing energy develop-
ments, exampled by the necessity for
Government provision of fuel supply risk
cover to enable a final investment decision
for the construction of additional gas-fired
generation capacity at Huntly (e3p).
• oil stocks being lower than required by the
International Energy Agency agreement
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which New Zealand has ratified.
• lack of arrangements to deal with the
consequences of the redetermination of
economically recoverable reserves associ-
ated with the Maui gas field, with conse-
quent uncertainties reverberating through-
out the energy sector.
The Maui redetermination has drawn overdue
attention to the fact that the current inventory
of proven natural gas reserves in this country
has fallen below a satisfactory level. In terms
of the threat to energy security, risk perception
has moved rapidly from “negligible” to “high”.
Barriers to improvement
The difficulty for New Zealand is that its past
history of dependence on Maui gas and
historical reliance on hydro for electricity
generation has significantly constrained
incentives for the development of alternative
fuel sources. The resulting lack of diversity
makes it especially important to ensure all
options are given careful consideration during
the transition to a post-Maui economy.
To do so requires an understanding of the
extent and nature of New Zealand’s energy
resources, our pattern of energy use and the
likely implications to the New Zealand economy
of unexpected disruption to supply or future
price volatility.
The spectre of “peak oil” further complicates
the issues. The strongly held belief amongst
some that existing known inventories of oil
and gas will not be able to be supported by
future discovery and development reinforces a
public perception of an emerging energy gap.
New Zealand is not exempt from this view
despite the lack of a sustainable exploration
effort in this country over the last 25 years and
the fact that most of our petroleum basins are
hardly explored.
This lack of knowledge and understanding of
New Zealand’s energy resources has already
manifested itself in short-term interventions by
Government in the energy market. It is impor-
tant for the country as a whole that the future
development of energy policy and any inter-
ventions that flow from that policy are based
on the strongest possible foundations of
information and analysis.
The balance of risk
As a country, we need to distinguish between a
potential short-term energy shortfall and the
essential strands to securing a sustainable
energy future. This future can be defined by
three fundamental requirements:
• extending New Zealand’s primary energy
resources;
• securing an acceptable level of strategic
reserve capacity; and
• planning long-term investment in alterna-
tive strategies.
Strategic energy reserves are taken here to
mean a ratio of reserves to production that is
sufficient to support an orderly market.  The
appropriate level of the reserve ratio depends
on the risk appetites of the major industry
players (including users), and may also be
backed by the Crown’s perspective of its
sovereign risk.
For most developed economies, the reserve
ratio is not as important as for New Zealand
because of their capacity to trade in the global
marketplace. New Zealand is a small market
that is physically distant from major trading
hubs.  We have no prospect of trading electric-
ity internationally and no realistic ability to be
anything other than a price taker in interna-
tional fuel markets.
At the one end of the energy security scale,
certainty of supply can be achieved by invest-
ing in “gold-plated” solutions that will guaran-
tee supply but at the expense of economic
efficiency. At the other end, higher supply risk
might be accepted but balanced by lower
energy costs and improved competitiveness.
The challenge at a national level is to achieve
the right balance, given existing energy supply
circumstances and fuel inventories.
Identifying a balance position requires consid-
ering the desire for certainty, the need for
economic competitiveness, the national
tolerance for risk, the adaptability of energy
consumers to change their existing patterns of
energy use and, finally, the economic benefit
that derives from diversity in supply.
This study examines the balance of risk in
relation to the crucial thermal fuel component
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of New Zealand’s energy security. The relative
value of fuel options depends on factors such
as location of the resource relative to energy
markets, economic impositions such as a
carbon tax, and development costs associated
with attainment of environmental and safety
standards. In the case of petroleum resources,
including natural gas, it may be possible to
add to the indigenous inventory; in this study
we consider the commercial incentives for
doing so under various scenarios.
THE PLACE OF THERMAL FUELS IN THE
ECONOMY
New Zealand’s primary energy supply is roughly
750 PJ/year. Natural gas, three quarters of it
historically from Maui, contributed approxi-
mately 30% of this in 2002, dropping to about
20% now. The sheer size and production
capacity of the Maui field relative to the size of
the New Zealand gas market has, until recently,
delivered plentiful gas to reticulated users,
electricity generators and petrochemicals
feedstock industries at a price essentially fixed
in the mid-1970s.
Depletion of supply from the Maui field has
thus had an immediate and material effect on
the future availability of thermal fuels, both for
direct use to supply process and low-grade
heat in the industrial, commercial and domestic
sectors, and for electricity generation. Thermal
fuels include gas and its derivative LPG, coal,
oil, and various petroleum distillates, as well
as renewable energy forms such as geothermal
energy and biomass.
As a legacy of the Maui era, about a quarter of
New Zealand’s electricity is produced from gas,
with gas-fired power stations consuming about
40% of natural gas production. When hydro
electricity is constrained, thermal fuels gener-
ate up to a third of our electricity. New
Zealand’s thermal generation system is an-
chored by power stations at Huntly (1000 MW),
Stratford (355 MW), Otahuhu B (380 MW), and
New Plymouth (400 MW). While other gas-fired
and oil-fired plants are generally only used in
hydro-firming, demand peaking, and other
back-up roles, there is increasing pressure on
them to supply base load.
About one third of New Zealand’s energy use is
associated with producing heat by various
means using a range of thermal fuels. Major
industry sectors that require some form of
process heat include forestry, basic metals,
fertiliser, meat and dairy processing.
In addition, about one third of electricity
production is used for industrial, commercial
and domestic heating. Industrial use of
electricity is dominated by dairy production
and processing, wood production, and the
manufacture of meat products, pulp and paper,
aluminium and methanol. Because many
industries require both heat and electricity, the
drive for efficiency has resulted in growing
uptake of cogeneration, using thermal fuels to
produce both forms of energy from the same
source. In the residential sector, energy for hot
water and heating is mainly supplied from
electricity.
Despite tighter supply and rising prices, gas
remains the preferred fuel for new electricity
generation plant and, until the redetermination
of the Maui field, gas demand had been
increasing as new combined-cycle and gas-fired
cogeneration plant came on stream. As New
Zealand’s developed gas reserves dwindle, our
capacity to meet this level of demand has only
been possible because the dual-fuel Huntly
power station has switched from gas to coal,
underlining our dependence on thermal fuels.
Key questions for the energy sector are the
extent to which oil and gas from other indig-
enous sources might supplement current Maui
reserves and the contribution to primary energy
supply that alternative thermal fuel supply
sources might make.
THE THERMAL FUELS GAP AND MARKET
RESPONSES
In early 2003, a redetermination of the remain-
ing economically recoverable reserves (EER) in
the Maui field was 14% less than had been
estimated in 1989. This downwards revision
had effects and implications for the economy
far beyond what this simple figure suggests.
Although these problems already existed, they
were masked by the nature of the Maui
Contract.
Apparently quite suddenly, New Zealand faced:
• a supply gap in indigenous natural gas
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Figure 1: New Zealand gas reserves showing the depletion of reserves during the Maui era
from early in the next decade unless new
discoveries are made
• a consequential impending supply gap in
electricity as both the supply and price of
natural gas as a generation fuel became
highly uncertain and forestalled needed
capacity expansion
• a severe degradation of energy security
conditions.
The gas gap arose because the excess supply
capacity of the Maui field and associated low
gas prices discouraged gas exploration at a
level that could sustain the rate of consump-
tion. New Zealand’s gas reserves inventory was
run down (Figure 1, Table 1) and there were no
longer sufficient reserves to satisfy existing
demand. With the accelerated depletion of
Maui came steeply rising prices as gas buyers
bid for diminishing reserves.
The gas gap is, in effect, a thermal fuels gap
because of the unwillingness of the market so
far to commit to alternatives unless fuel
switching is an option.
The nature of the Maui Contract also resulted
in serious impediments to efficient
rationalisation of the market. In the absence of
a robust public policy framework, the market
stalled as participants appeared paralysed by
the new environment. After a period of
readjustment and reassessment of the new
market situation, and as existing supply
contracts expire, new gas contracts are now
being struck at prices far higher than those
which prevailed a year or two ago.
With increasing scarcity and steeply rising
prices has come demand destruction from
lower-value users such as petrochemicals
manufacture. Where there is an immediate
ability to switch fuels, there has been substitu-
tion away from natural gas to alternatives such
as coal. Fuel switching has been especially
notable in the case of the Huntly power station
which has switched from being substantially
gas-fired to being entirely coal-fired. The dairy
processing industry is also turning increasingly
to coal. Demand destruction and fuel switching
have resulted in natural gas use falling from its
peak of about 240 PJ/year in 2002 to less than
150 PJ/year now.
Even at this level, the reserves situation and
future deliverability of indigenous gas is
insufficient to meet demand. Despite the drop
in consumption, the hydro shortage in the
winter of 2003 highlighted the unpreparedness
of the energy sector to deal with supply
shocks. The hydro shortage combined with the
inability of gas-fired generation to make up the
shortfall meant that coal had to be imported,
at short notice and sourced on the spot
market, to avoid major electricity supply
disruptions.
There have been other serious but less obvious
effects of this thermal fuels gap. Investment
decisions for much needed incremental thermal
electricity generation capacity have been
delayed and, in discussion with major industry
players during the course of this study, there
has been some indication that industry
investment in New Zealand has been deferred
because of uncertainty in fuel supply.
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As the energy sector continues its transition
from the certainty, flexibility and low prices of
Maui supply into the post-Maui environment,
the challenge is to find strategies and policies
that best:
• mitigate the impact of rising energy costs
on the economy
• maintain as much flexibility as possible
• balance the risks and opportunities for the
New Zealand economy.
• improve New Zealand’s energy security.
These issues form the catalyst for this current
study. The unsatisfactory thermal fuels situa-
tion that has evolved is beginning to manifest
itself in significant downstream effects. An
understanding of the implication of different
response options is critical to improving
national energy security.
It is thus important that we re-examine current
industry strategies and offer a framework for
future planning and investment.
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the indigenous gas scenario
The indigenous gas scenario examines the
proposition that New Zealand’s growing
thermal fuel requirements could be met
through ongoing discovery and development of
natural gas resources within our own territory.
The scenario initially sets up a natural gas
demand side perspective against which supply
potential and attendant uncertainties can be
assessed; then develops an indigenous natural
gas supply and demand equation with
plausible assumptions regarding the potential
of New Zealand’s gas resource endowment.
A likely price path for natural gas, and the
consequential impacts on the New Zealand
energy and industrial sectors are addressed in
a later section of the report. Because of the
importance of natural gas for electricity
generation, the impact on the electricity sector,
including downstream impacts, is also
analysed. The analysis assumes no significant
changes to the regulatory or market
environments of the energy sector.
THE DEMAND SIDE PERSPECTIVE
Demand for natural gas in New Zealand can be
broken down into four categories;
differentiated by substitutability and inferred
threshold values at which buyers would be
expected to withdraw demand.
The first, highest value tranche of about 65 PJ/
year is for reticulated direct use (domestic,
commercial and industrial) and associated
cogeneration of electricity. It cannot be easily
substituted or readily deferred, and it seems
unlikely that any significant fraction of this
demand would be shed readily given that the
electricity alternative is likely to rise in price in
proportion to gas, and that major capital
investment would be required to convert to
coal, liquid, or other fuels.
The second tranche of up to 44 PJ/year is used
by existing gas combined cycle (GCC) power
stations. These are non-substitutable but their
utilisation varies as a function of electricity
price, so that the demand is deferrable until
called into the electricity market.  During
periods of high hydroelectric generating
capacity these stations are less likely to be
used so that their owners can conserve their
entitlements to gas for use in periods of higher
power prices.
The third tranche is the large petrochemical
demand capacity (predominantly Methanex but
also Ballance Agri-Nutrients) of about 100 PJ/
year neglecting progressive moth-balling. This
is also deferrable but not substitutable, and
seems likely to compete for available gas
above the 65 PJ/year of core demand except
when  gas prices are high1.
The remaining demand capacity is represented
by thermal electricity plant with the capacity to
switch fuels: the Huntly and New Plymouth
power stations. We assume that these plants
will probably remain out of the gas market for
as long as supplies are short.
Three demand cases are depicted in this
scenario (see Figures 2-4) as a plausible set of
projections without attributing any particular
likelihood of outcome:
• full petrochemical manufacture at 2001
levels
• limited petrochemical manufacture at
approximately current levels
• closure of gas-based petrochemical plants.
These demand projections are overlaid on the
various gas supply scenarios developed below.
NATURAL GAS PRICES AND DEMAND
ATTRITION
With the redetermination of the Maui Contract
reserves, negotiation of successor
arrangements, and the depletion of the Maui
field, prices have risen to reflect both the
resulting scarcity and the emergence of a
1 For example, although Methanex’s entitlements to Maui
gas (which comprised most of their feedstock) were
curtailed abruptly in February 2003, they have been able
to procure enough gas in the market, combined with non-
Maui arrangements in place, to operate their facilities at
approximately 40% of capacity in 2003, an estimated
44% in 2004, and a forecast 15% in 2005 (based on
Methanex third quarter 2004 interim report).  Also,
Ballance have been able to secure a 1-year supply
contract for their full 7 PJ requirement from the May 2005
expiry of previous arrangements.
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functioning market freed of the inflexibilities of
the original Maui Contract.  Transactions in the
emergent gas market signal the need to either
find more indigenous gas, import it or switch
to an alternative fuel in order to satisfy
demand. Recent anecdotal evidence indicates
prices over $6/GJ for new supply contracts in
some instances, compared to the previous
Maui price which was in the range of $2 to
$2.50/GJ.
In this report, gas prices are assumed to rise
from a current average level of $4.50-$5/GJ by
4% a year to around $7.50/GJ by 2015. Price
rises will be moderated from even higher levels
by shedding of demand from those consumers
who cannot afford to use higher cost gas, by
the price of substitute fuels such as coal or
fuel oil, and by the development of new
discoveries. Ultimately, long-term gas prices
will be capped by the import price, which in
New Zealand’s case means the price of LNG.
The recent responses of major gas users, such
as the successful bidding from petrochemical
manufacturers together with switching to the
use of coal as fuel for Huntly, show the effects
of rising prices and expectation of future
shortage on consumers; and the important
influence large-scale users exert in the small
New Zealand gas market. The lower-value users
are the first to cease bidding for gas and,
where this leads to curtail of their output,
there will be consequential negative effects on
industrial output and a potential lowering of
the country’s export base.
This situation underscores one of the main
difficulties with the small size of the New
Zealand gas market. Without large consumers
such as Methanex, and with the climatically-
driven cyclicity in demand for thermal
electricity, the economy may struggle to fully
take up large tranches of new supply, such as
that expected from the development of the
Pohokura field. While the e3p gas-fired station
will add a demand increment of around 20 PJ/
year, this of itself does not justify the economic
development of the Pohokura field.  Also,
whilst energy suppliers may wish to reserve
developed gas for electricity and gas demand
(especially during periods when the output of
non-thermal energy is high and energy prices
depressed) there may be circumstances when
prices offered by non-energy users will be
sufficient to secure them ongoing gas supplies.
In the short term, other demand shedding and
fuel substitution possibilities are limited by the
inflexibility of existing energy-consuming plant
and the availability of substitute fuels.
However, consumers are more able to respond
to scarcity and rising price signals over the
longer term. There is already evidence that
some industrial gas users are planning to
switch to coal.
Higher-value gas users such as reticulated gas
retailers and electricity generators have been
able to secure supplies and would seem to be
adequately covered for a number of years,
albeit at higher prices but with considerable
ability to pass through price increases by way
of higher tariffs.   Their strategies for balancing
gas entitlements with demand for their energy
services will be a key factor in the evolution of
the New Zealand thermal fuels market in the
post-Maui era.
THE SUPPLY SIDE PERSPECTIVE
Table 1 shows published gas reserves as at
January 2004. All these fields, at various stages
of depletion or development, are in the
Taranaki Basin. Reserves in the Pohokura field
are not included, but have been stated to be
700PJ (proven plus probable). New Zealand
thus had 2162 PJ of estimated recoverable
reserves as at 1 January 2004.
At the peak annual production level of 242 PJ
(set in 2001), these reserves represent just nine
years of production. At the current production
rate of about 150 PJ/year, they  represent 14
years of consumption. Without Pohokura or
Kupe, developed reserves represent about
eight years of production at 150 PJ/year,
underlining the importance of the timely
development of these fields and the
opportunity for immediate development of any
further discoveries as their reserves are proven.
The indigenous gas scenario examines three
gas supply cases:
• supply from developed fields
• supply from developed fields and those
approaching development (Kupe and
Pohokura)
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• supply from all these fields, together with
new discoveries.
Gas supply from known fields
Figure 2 illustrates the expected production of
natural gas from developed fields overlaid with
three projected demand profiles.  Total
production from Maui is taken to include all of
the official proven plus probable (“2P”)
reserves tabulated in September 2004, and the
model assumes further development of
onshore Taranaki fields to provide for a small
overall increase in production over the next
few years.  Estimated 2004 demand is based
on information concerning consumption in both
electricity generation and petrochemicals.
The supply situation for 2005 and 2006 can
best be described as “tight”, with little left
over for other uses once reticulated
consumption and the two existing GCC
electricity generation plants are accounted for.
Post-ERR Maui gas will be required by 2005,
excluding all petrochemical consumption. While
Methanex is believed to have around 20 PJ
secured for use in 2005, any additional gas for
petrochemicals in 2005 and 2006 is essentially
reliant on gas from the Maui above ERR
becoming available. If this source is secure, up
to 75 PJ may be available for limited
petrochemicals manufacture in 2005 and 2006.
By 2007, when Genesis Energy’s e3p GCC
station at Huntly is scheduled to be
commissioned, reserves from Pohokura and
Kupe will probably be required to meet
expected consumption levels.
Figure 3 illustrates the expected annual supply
of natural gas, including Pohokura and Kupe,
overlaid with the three projected demand
profiles but without provision for further
discoveries.
The Pohokura field is expected to come on
stream in late 2006 with an initial production
capacity of about 73 PJ a year in 2007. The
smaller Kupe field is expected to commence
development in the second half of 2005 with
first gas delivery in 2007 at about 20 PJ a year.
The development of the Pohokura and Kupe
fields and the commissioning of the e3p GCC
station in 2007 will provide much needed
“breathing space” for gas and electricity
supply, respectively. However, there are some
significant risks in terms of both deliverable
1 
 Reserves are estimated as “proven and probable” or P50 by the field operators
2 Excludes LPG for Kapuni, Maui, Tariki/Ahuroa and Rimu/Kauri and also re-injection for Kapuni. The figures here differ
from Table E.2a (MED Energy Data File on-line (January 2003)) in that own use, losses and flared
are included here.
3 Gross calorific values are for the given production figures.
4 Includes information for Goldie well.
Reserves1Field
Ultimate
Recoverable
PJ
As at 1 January
2004
PJ
Gross Calorific
Value3
PJ/Mm3
Production2
2002
PJ
Kaimiro/Ngatoro4
Kapuni2
Kupe
Maui2
McKee
Mangahewa
Piakau
Tariki /Ahuroa2
Waihapa/Ngaere
Rimu/Kauri2
23
1,100
309
3,825
210
91
7
132
36
81
6
343
309
539
75
66
0
48
0
78
0.045
0.025
0.041
0.041
0.039
0.045
0.044
0.042
2.29
24.18
0.00
121.99
6.83
8.41
0.00
15.29
0.23
1.85
TOTAL 5,812 1,462 180.07
Table 1: New Zealand gas reserves. Source: MED Energy Data File January 2004.
Page 16 Energy Supply in the Post-Maui Era
gas quantities and timing of delivery,
increasing over time. Slippage in the
commissioning of the Pohokura field would
create an undesirably tight natural gas supply
situation, even more so if assumptions made
here as to the availability of a Maui tranche
above that deemed ERR do not fully
materialise.
Projected production rates for Pohokura
suggest that there will be gas available beyond
that required for reticulation and GCC electricity
generation until early in the next decade, a
situation that could see some gas become
available for use at the existing Huntly power
station or for petrochemicals, provided prices
are acceptable for those uses and the plant
still exist in working order. The alternative is
for this “surplus” gas to be banked.  This is
unlikely to be in the interests of economic field
Figure 2: Supply capacity of developed gas fields.
Figure 3: Supply capacity of developed gas fields plus Kupe and Pohokura.
Page 17The Indigenous Gas Scenario
operations nor of the income requirements of
the field owners, and the Pohokura contracts
agreed during 2004 are likely to include at
least some “take or pay” provisions.
Assuming extra Maui reserves and expansion of
onshore fields are together capable of meeting
the assumed offtake, and the timely
development of both Pohokura and Kupe, new
undiscovered reserves will not necessarily be
called for until early in the next decade,
particularly if petrochemical consumption were
to cease entirely.
The potential for new discoveries
Exploration investment in New Zealand has
been recovering from a depressed state in the
1990s, but has not yet reached the level
needed to provide for sufficient discoveries to
sustain New Zealand’s reserves inventory.
Because of low Maui gas prices, oil has until
recently been the main target for exploration
with gas discoveries an often commercially
disappointing by-product. Gas is now
recognised as valuable in its own right with the
strong upward pressure on gas price
expectations as Maui depletes.
As prices have been struck for gas tranches
from Pohokura, Kupe and Maui tail gas,
incentives for more resolute gas exploration
activity have dramatically improved.
Figure 4 shows that the thermal fuels gap
could be met through a plausible scenario of
rising levels of petroleum exploration that
resulted in a new sustained level of gas
discovery, expansion of the gas reserves
inventory, and development of new fields.
Due to the lead time required to bring new
discoveries to market, some new discoveries
will need to be made well before 2009. While
onshore Taranaki discoveries may be able to
be brought into production within about three
years, offshore Taranaki discoveries can be
assumed to take around five years to bring
into production, or 10 years in new production
theatres.
This highlights the urgency to make new
discoveries within the next year or two, not
only for security of supply but also to prove
that the New Zealand resource has the
potential to satisfy local demand. In fact,
discovery rates in excess of consumption rates
are required to improve the New Zealand
reserves inventory situation.
Unlike in many countries where natural gas has
been discovered and awaits markets to fund
development, New Zealand does not have such
a luxury. While higher exploration levels will
Figure 4: Supply capacity of developed gas fields, those nearly ready for development, discovered
reserves and possible new discoveries.
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increase the prospects of more commercial
discoveries of oil and gas, any discoveries will
need to be brought to market as soon as
possible. This “just-in-time” situation presents
its own risks for energy consumers and the
economy.
Given well-conceived and adequately funded
effort, the fundamentals for further discoveries
are strong. New Zealand has small gas reserves
but an enormous unrealised resource potential,
especially offshore.
Figure 5 shows the classification of petroleum
resources in relation to the business processes
relative to indigenous natural gas. The
imperative for New Zealand is to foster
investment in the exploration and discovery
process (black arrow) to move undiscovered
potential into discovered resources.
The grey arrow represents production,
coincident with the delivery of gas from proven
developed fields to purchasers who may either
on-sell it, processed or raw, or convert it into
electricity or petrochemical commodities such
as methanol and urea.
When during the Maui era the reserves base
was large relative to production, then there
was little or no commercial merit in adding to
it through investment in either appraisal and
development (white arrows) or through
exploration and discovery (black arrow), except
that gas is also produced and indeed
discovered incidentally to production of and
exploration for oil. The fact that much of the
known natural gas in the world has been
discovered as a consequence of oil exploration
accounts for its historically discounted value
relative to its utility compared to most other
energy sources.
Under an aggressive exploration climate, there
are realistic prospects for restoring the
country’s reserves inventory and returning to a
situation of reliable gas supplies. Onshore
production for a period could be double
current production levels, and offshore
production similar to that which the Maui field
produced at its peak. In aggregate, production
levels could be similar to the 200-250 PJ/year
achieved in the later part of the Maui era.
These production levels would allow the
petrochemicals industries to operate on a
similar scale to that held during the Maui era,
if gas prices are acceptable, and to open up
the opportunity for further increments of gas-
fired electricity generation capacity if new
capacity is not provided through alternative
generation sources such as coal or renewables.
While not all are prerequisites, some
combination of the following factors would be
produced
reserves
proven probable possible
contingent resources
most likely estimate high estimatelowestimate
high estimatemost likely estimatelowestimate
prospective resources
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Figure 5: Classification of petroleum resources. Arrows show the enhancement of certainty that results
from exploration and development. Grey arrow = production; white arrows = appraisal and development;
black arrow = exploration and discovery.
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required for such a scenario to eventuate.
• Continuing exploration success, especially
further oil discoveries.
• High prices bid for tranches of gas from
fields currently being developed. Pohokura
and Kupe gas are by far the most
volumetrically important of these, but
smaller tranches from onshore Taranaki
developments could play a role in price
setting.
• Strong fundamentals for the global E&P
sector with capital in-flows to encourage
investment in high-risk, long lead-time
exploration prospects in under-explored
New Zealand prospects. Almost of
necessity, this would require investment in
New Zealand by top-ranked exploration
companies who do not currently operate
here.
• Continuing development of enabling
technologies and market dynamics that
would improve the prospects for
developing some of New Zealand’s
stranded potential gas resources.
New Zealand has huge potential to convert its
geological resource endowment into reserves.
The alternative is to supplement a dwindling
indigenous natural gas supply with thermal
fuels from other sources.
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the LNG scenario
If natural gas use in New Zealand is to con-
tinue at levels of 150 PJ/year or more, and if
the indigenous resource base cannot be
maintained through discoveries to match the
rate of consumption, then alternative supplies
of gas will be needed to make up the shortfall.
Importing natural gas through pipelines is not
a possibility for New Zealand, as is the case for
many gas-importing countries. If new indig-
enous gas resources are not discovered, the
most discussed alternative to remedy shortfalls
of natural gas supply is to import liquefied
natural gas (LNG).
This does not imply that other fuels, notably
coal, are not suitable alternatives to gas for
thermal fuel supply in New Zealand. These
fuels are dealt with later in this report.
THE NATURE OF LNG TRADING
The LNG supply chain
LNG is natural gas that has been cooled to
minus 160oC at atmospheric pressure, allowing
the gas to be stored at 1/610th of its original
volume, and more economically transported
from its source to regasification facilities at or
near the locations of consumption. As a rule of
thumb, LNG becomes a cheaper mode of
moving natural gas than pipelines once the
distance between supply and demand points
exceeds about 2000 km.
The LNG supply chain comprises:
• the source gas field
• a liquefaction plant usually consisting of a
number of liquefaction trains
• tankers transporting the LNG from the
liquefaction plant
• a receiving terminal which consists of
storage and regasification facilities.
Because it is not economic to pump LNG for
any distance, it needs to be stored and
regasified close to its unloading point.
Regasification can be carried out on a land-
based LNG regasification plant near a tanker
port, an offshore LNG regasification station
(which provides a mooring but not LNG
storage), or an LNG regasification vessel (RV)
with the regasification unit located on the
vessel and the vessel itself serving as the
storage facility. Regasified LNG can then be
piped through conventional transmission and
distribution systems to consumers.
LNG is a large-scale, capital-intensive industry
involving investment in liquefaction plants,
tankers and receiving terminals, so that LNG
projects require large gas reserves and certain
markets in order to proceed. Increasing plant
size is used to exploit economies of scale to
reduce costs. This is particularly true for
liquefaction plants but also applies to the
increasing size of tankers and receiving
terminals. Liquefaction train capacity generally
exceeds 1.5 million tonnes a year (about 80
PJ), with most liquefaction plants having
multiple trains. Storage and regasification plant
capacities invariably exceed 200 million litres
(about 5 PJ), with five times this size being
common. Upscaling and maximum utilisation is
of the essence for exploiting economies of
scale and reducing unit cost, and potential
developments need to be considered in this
context.
A typical standard sized tanker of 135,000 -
160,000 m3 costs around US$150 million to
build. The LNG tanker fleet is growing rapidly,
from 128 at the beginning of 2002 to 154 as at
the end of 2003, with the fleet size projected
by the IEA to reach 500 tankers by 2030.
Charter rates are generally not widely
publicised but are in the range of US$60,000 -
100,000 per day for medium and long-term
charters. Shipping costs are falling, mainly from
improved construction processes and the
economies of scale of increasingly larger
tankers. Spot charter rates are dependent on
market conditions, but rates of US$150,000 per
day are not unknown.
World LNG trade
About one quarter of world natural gas
production is traded, comprising 17.4%
pipeline natural gas and 6.5% LNG. LNG
consumption increased by 6.2% a year in the
decade between 1992 and 2002, and a similar
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rate of growth is projected for the next few
years. In 2003, LNG sales increased by 12%
while overall natural gas consumption grew by
only 2%. Thus, while the LNG is a large and
rapidly expanding industry, it comprises only a
small percentage of the overall natural gas
industry.
The current state of world LNG markets owes
much of its existence to the development of
the East Asia markets since 1969, with Japan,
South Korea and Taiwan currently taking
around 70% of the world’s LNG imports. Each
country is essentially completely dependent on
LNG for its natural gas supplies, with energy
security more important than price. Govern-
ment involvement to facilitate the importation
of LNG and development of the domestic
consumption base, together with rapid eco-
nomic and industrial development in all three
countries, have meant that LNG imports have
grown rapidly.
Further market expansion is expected to come
from the large and strongly growing economies
of China and India where natural gas is pro-
jected to gain an increasing share of the direct
use, industrial and power generation markets. In
the USA, increasing LNG imports seem likely to
be needed to meet expanding gas consumption
as pipeline supplies from within continental
North America are expected to remain relatively
static and could even decline.
LNG contracts and pricing
World LNG markets can be divided into three
regions which currently operate fairly indepen-
dently: Asia, Europe and North America (Figure
6). Historically, buyers have had to enter into
long-term supply and purchase agreements
(SPAs) of 15 years or longer before projects
proceeded. Natural gas prices, and especially
LNG prices, are generally linked to the price of
crude oil using agreed formulae (Figure 7).
The shifts in pricing formulae depicted in
Figure 7 represent changing market conditions.
How market conditions will evolve is uncertain
but they currently appear to favour buyers of
LNG. Rapidly growing demand is being ex-
ceeded by even more rapidly expanding supply.
For the first time in the industry’s short history,
there is uncontracted liquefaction and shipping
capacity coming onto the market.
Growth in demand, however, is expected to be
underpinned by the strongly growing and large
economies of China and India. There is also a
view that rapidly expanding USA imports
required to meet growing natural gas demand
will act to underpin both demand and prices.
In a global context, therefore, the new pricing
formula shown in Figure 7 may well illustrate
the best that New Zealand could achieve due
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Figure 6: Regional LNG import prices. Data Source: IEA Energy Prices and Taxes.
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to our small market.
The Asian markets of Japan, Korea and Taiwan
have dominated world LNG trade for over 30
years. Asian LNG prices have often been 20-
50% higher than in Europe or the USA, partly
because of the link to crude oil prices which
tend to be higher in Asia than elsewhere.
China’s entry into LNG imports has recently set
a precedent for lower Asian prices. Given the
potential size of the Chinese and Indian
markets, these buyers have the potential to
influence the whole dynamics of the industry.
As long-term contracts expire, Asian buyers will
seek contracts that are more flexible and more
attuned to market pricing, with some trade-offs
in energy security. The historical dominance of
long-term contracts will diminish, to be
progressively replaced by a greater diversity of
SPAs along the whole supply chain. The
regional differentiation in prices may narrow to
the advantage of Asian buyers. On the other
hand, expansion of the North American market
in response to gas market growth and con-
straints on domestic pipeline gas supplies may
play a role in underpinning world LNG prices.
Although the historical linkage to oil prices
may well weaken, it is not expected to be
entirely severed. Overall, trade in LNG will
become more dynamic, although not to the
extent of world oil markets or North American
pipeline gas markets, and prices seem likely to
fall.
Assuming the ‘new formula’ as shown in Figure
7, FoB prices for LNG are indicated at US$3.30/
GJ2 at US$30/barrel and US$4.00/GJ at US$45/
barrel of oil.
On the supply side, known gas reserves are
adequate for about 67 years of consumption.
Upstream developments in Iran, the Middle
East, Russia, and South America in particular
will influence LNG supplies. A likely source for
LNG imports into New Zealand is Indonesia or
Australia.
LNG IN THE NEW ZEALAND CONTEXT
Project scale
The starting point for considering LNG importa-
tion to New Zealand is agreement on project
scale.  Our analysis suggests a maximum
additional annual gas requirement of perhaps
up to 80 PJ, depending on the extent of
demand shedding and the timing of an LNG
project. Coincidentally, 80 PJ/year is about the
amount that a typical LNG tanker would be
able to deliver on a full charter basis, assum-
ing a 15 day turnaround schedule.
This amount, whilst large compared to the
current size of the New Zealand gas market of
about 150 PJ/year, is only about 0.2% of
current world LNG trade and at the lower end
of the minimum economic scale. This poses a
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Figure 7: Comparison of “new” and “old” price formulae for LNG based on a crude oil price
known as the Japanese Crude Cocktail (JCC) formula.
2 LNG prices are usually denominated in US$ per mmBtu,
and for this report have been converted at 1 million Btu
to 1.0551GJ. Prices can be either FoB (free-on-board; more
common) or ex-ship (delivered).
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likely disadvantage when considering LNG
importation into New Zealand.
Infrastructure requirements and costs
The New Zealand-based component of the LNG
supply chain is a regasification facility and
associated infrastructure, the options for which
are:
• A land-based LNG regasification near a
tanker port.
• An LNG RV (regasification vessel) with the
regasification unit located on the vessel
and the vessel itself serving as the storage
facility
• An offshore LNG regasification facility. This
option is not considered economically
viable and is not considered further.
Port facilities
The first infrastructure requirement for an LNG
scenario is a suitable port facility for either an
LNG tanker or a permanently moored LNG RV.
The scenario examined in this study assumes
that LNG will be supplied using a 145,000 m3
LNG tanker, and a mooring or berthing point
must be able to receive a vessel of this size.
The port configuration for either a tanker or an
LNG RV is much the same.
Possible location options for a land-based
plant include:
• Upgrade of Port Taranaki (WestGate).
• Upgrade of Marsden Point and lay a new
gas pipeline to Auckland.
The land-based option
A conventional land-based receiving and
storage terminal and regasification plant for a
facility sized to supply 80 PJ/y is estimated to
cost approximately US$280 million plus
infrastructure costs of between US$60m and
US$90m depending on location and specific
site factors. Such a facility would supply an
annual quantity of 1.56 million tonnes per year
LNG, with a maximum daily delivery of 5.1 kt.
Annual operating costs are estimated at
US$16m/y.
These are fixed facilities that have no alterna-
tive use. The high capital costs of such an
installation would need a high level of utilisa-
tion over a considerable period of time to
make the project economic. Unit costs required
to service the investment escalate rapidly if the
plant is not fully utilised.
An investor would also need to be confident
that the asset would not be stranded by
cheaper alternative thermal fuels such as
indigenous natural gas or coal. To realise a
land-based scheme, a long-term take-or-pay
SPA would probably be required. The implica-
tions of such an arrangement are discussed on
page 23.
The regasification vessel option
LNG regasification vessels are an emerging
application of LNG storage and regasification.
The appeal of this approach is that it removes
some of the costs and inflexibility associated
with a land-based plant. Although not function-
ally complicated, its novelty in terms of both
technology application and LNG delivery clearly
opens up a number of risks that have not yet
been tested in the market. Innovative and
flexible contracts, certainly as far as the LNG
industry is concerned, would be needed to
take advantage of this much more flexible
option. It is unclear whether and how quickly
the RV application will develop, but the first
ships are close to launch.
The cost of RV implementation is lower than
the more conventional land-based receiving
and regasification terminal option. An esti-
mated cost of US$200 million for a
regasification vessel capable of supplying the
same quantities as a land-based facility
represents the minimum capital cost for the
LNG RV option and can be broken down to
US$150m for the tanker and US$50m for the
on-ship regasification equipment.
Whilst storage volumes will be less than the
equivalent land-based facilities, opportunities
in New Zealand could include permanent
mooring to the Maui B platform (although this
has not been examined). Ancillary infrastructure
costs and working capital of US$30 million
take the estimated capital commitment to
around US$230m, some US$110m less than for
the land-base scheme. Annual estimated
operating costs are similar at approximately
US$15.6m/y.
Very importantly, the RV option reduces the
possibility of a stranded asset should the
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demand for LNG fall below projected levels or
other circumstances change. Using RVs also
opens up the possibility of LNG being used to
serve temporary shortfalls in natural gas supply
on a bridging basis, with both LNG and vessels
being contracted more or less on a spot basis.
On the negative side, the short-term/spot LNG
market is not nearly as well developed as it is
for oil trade and, although increasing, currently
comprises only about 5-10% of total volume.
The price of spot cargos will be more volatile
than for a long-term contract.
Another consideration is that New Zealand
thermal fuel demand is counter-seasonal to the
much larger northern hemisphere LNG market.
It would not be hard to imagine that co-
operative and mutually beneficial contract
arrangements for both capacity and LNG
delivery along the whole supply chain could be
made with Asian importers. This becomes
increasingly possible if and when the nascent
RV system gains critical mass in world LNG
markets.
However, this does not mean that the LNG RV
option could provide a silver bullet to solve
New Zealand’s dry year hydro capacity prob-
lems. While there is potential for flexibility, a
great deal of investigation is required to asses
the commercial viability of short-term LNG
importation.
LNG price
Excluding infrastructure costs, the price
components of LNG supply are the ex
regasification plant (FoB) gas price, the
shipping cost, and the storage and
regasification cost. Of these, only the last can
be controlled by the gas buyer. Project eco-
nomics are set out below.
In addition, two other key variables will also
impact on the eventual ex regasification plant
price; the oil price, to which LNG prices are
linked by agreed formulae (Figure 7), and the
exchange rate. For the purposes of this report,
project economics are based on an oil price of
US$30/bbl and a NZ/US exchange rate of 55c/
US$. Table 3 gives a range of outcomes for
different oil price and exchange rate assump-
tions.
Project economics
Based on the study cost estimates and the
assumptions set out below, project economic
analyses were performed for both the land-
based and RV options. The processing tariff was
chosen as the key reporting variable as an
indication of a likely tolling fee for a New
Zealand regasification facility. This tariff was
varied and plotted against the required Internal
Rate of Return (IRR) to achieve a zero net
present value (NPV) for each process (Figure 8).
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Figure 8: Comparison of land-based LNG and an LNG RV showing IRR as a function of processing tariff.
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The assumptions made are:
• plant life of 15 years
• straight line depreciation, with no salvage
value after 15 years
• working capital is the cost of LNG to fill the
storage tanks
• working capital is injected at year 0 and
recovered in year 15
• 50% production in year 1, and 100%
afterwards
• production to begin after four years for a
land-based plant and two years for an LNG
RV.
This indicates that a land-based scheme would
need to earn a storage and regasification tariff
of approximately US$1.15/GJ to justify the
investment in facilities and infrastructure. From
this an overall LNG price is arrived at, as
shown in Table 2. Assuming that the LNG can
be obtained FoB for US$3.30/GJ (prevailing oil
price of US$30/barrel), and with a shipping
tariff of around US$0.33/GJ, a LPG gas cost of
NZ$8.70/GJ (NZ$1 = US$0.55) is arrived at
before the natural gas enters the transmission
and distribution system.
A scheme employing a regasification vessel,
effectively using a tanker as a storage and
regasification plant, would need a
regasification tariff in the range US$0.80/GJ, to
achieve an IRR of 10-15%. Assuming again that
the LNG can be obtained fob for US$3.30/GJ,
and with a shipping tariff of around US$0.33/
GJ, a gas cost of NZ$8.05/GJ is arrived at
before the gas enters the transmission and
distribution system.
Table 3 extends the analysis for a range of oil
price and exchange rate assumptions.
Cost component Conventional
land-based
Regasification vessel
LNG FoB
Shipping
Storage /regasification
tariff @ 12.5% IRR US$1.15 US$0.80
US$4.78 US$4.43Total
NZ$ @ 0.55 NZ$8.70 NZ$8.05
US
$/G
J
US$3.30
US$0.33
Table 2: LNG price components comparing conventional land-based and
regasification vessel options.
Oil price
US$/bbl
LNG price
US$/GJ
LNG price
NZ$/GJ
@45c/US$1
LNG price
NZ$/GJ
@55c/US$1
LNG price
NZ$/GJ
@65c/US$1
20 3.00 9.48 7.75 6.56
25 3.25 10.00 8.19 6.93
30 3.50 10.53 8.70 7.29
35 3.75 11.06 9.05 7.66
40 4.00 11.58 9.48 8.02
45 4.25 12.11 9.91 8.38
50 4.50 12.64 10.34 8.75
Table 3: Forecast LNG price as a function of oil price and exchange rate.
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alternative thermal fuels
New Zealand needs thermal energy solutions
that can balance energy security against higher
costs as well as contribute to the need for the
flexibility of energy delivery that the Maui field
allowed. In particular, New Zealand has to find
ways of better dealing with the seasonal
problems associated with a hydro-dominated
electricity supply system that is subject to
uncertain availability and is most constrained
when demand is highest.
The potential of the indigenous natural gas
sector, whose development has been held back
by the dominance of the Maui field and Maui
Contract, needs to be given an opportunity to
be realised. Alternatives should also be
considered, at least until this option is fore-
closed.
There is a range of alternative thermal energy
supply solutions, which may be used on their
own or in combination, either sustained or
occasional, and either as permanent or
“bridge” solutions. In addition to indigenous
gas and LNG imports, these alternatives could
include:
• increased mining of indigenous coal or
importing of coal for burning in new power
stations and for direct use
• importing compressed natural gas (CNG)
• importing naphtha or liquid petroleum gas
(LPG) for processing into SNG (synthetic/
substitute natural gas) or burning in
existing power stations
• coal seam gas (CSG), also known as coal
bed methane (CBM)
Of these, importing naphtha or LPG, at prices
of around US$6-7/GJ before shipping, is too
expensive. While both, and LPG especially,
could increase market share in some niche
applications such as extending beyond domes-
tic use in the South Island or for commercial
cooking, we eliminate both as options to fill
any gas gap. Similarly, the use of diesel or fuel
oils to provide electricity or fire industrial
plants would also be expensive and is not
further considered here.
3 JM Barry and others 1994. Coal resources of New Zealand.
Resource information report 16. Ministry of Commerce.
COAL
Coal has often been considered the “backstop”
fuel for New Zealand’s electricity needs. Now,
with a gas shortage and higher gas prices in
the post-Maui era, coal has the potential to re-
assert itself in the thermal fuels markets
generally, for both electricity generation and
industrial use. Along with indigenous natural
gas, which is reliant on new discoveries being
made soon, coal is the other apparent option
for thermal fuel supply in New Zealand because
of the extent of the proven indigenous re-
source and its opportunity to improve fuel
diversity. Coal already supplies over 9% of our
primary energy supply.
One important advantage of coal is that it can
be stockpiled, which gives it the potential to
replace the swing capacity of the Maui field.
For electricity generation, this flexibility makes
coal suitable for peak as well as base-load use.
While the gas sector in New Zealand has so far
been based entirely on indigenous supply, coal
is freely traded and import prices, which will
be on an export or import parity basis plus any
carbon tax that may be implemented, may not
only be lower but less volatile. This tradability
also means that it can be used as a “bridge”
fuel during shortfalls of indigenous gas supply,
or even coal supply. This is already occurring at
the Huntly power station.
Capacity of New Zealand coal resources
Economically recoverable resources are
estimated at 150,000 PJ, or about 75 times
current gas reserves, although New Zealand’s
coal resource inventory3 is effectively 15 years
out of date. About 20% of estimated recover-
able resources are the higher grade bituminous
and sub-bituminous coals, which account for
almost all current production of about 130 PJ/
year. About half of this is exported. At this rate
of production, New Zealand has coal resources
to last 230 years, disregarding the enormous
lignite resource in the Southland/Otago
regions.
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However, the ability to deliver coal to points of
consumption is dependent on a supply chain
being in place, including:
• operating mines
• reliable production capacity or inventory
stockpile of a suitable grade and quantity
• transportation arrangements.
The inability to supply domestic coal to the
Huntly power station during the electricity crisis
of 2003 exposed the difficulties of substantially
increasing coal supply at very short notice
outside of contractual arrangements, and coal
had to be imported. Rather than indicating any
weakness in the New Zealand coal supply
chain, it shows again the reliance there has
been on the swing capacity of the Maui field to
cover thermal fuel requirements in dry years.
Coal supply requires higher levels of market
commitment.
About 70 PJ of coal was consumed in New
Zealand in 2003, and the dual-fuel capability of
the Huntly power station results in a total
capacity to consume over 100 PJ/year from
existing plant. Export markets have not so far
been competing for the same resources, being
generally for a higher grade of coal for special-
ist metallurgical uses than that required for
most demand in New Zealand, although
exports of thermal coal are increasing.
Current coal mines are located in the Waikato
(servicing principally New Zealand Steel’s
Glenbrook mill as well as the Huntly power
station and several major industrial customers),
Otago/Southland (servicing mainly local
industrial and domestic markets) and on the
West Coast (servicing mainly export markets).
The output of Waikato mines was about 38 PJ
in 2003. Principal miner Solid Energy Ltd has
reported reserves of 320 PJ in the Waikato that
would be economic to develop at prices of $3
to $3.50/GJ. While these reserves are modest in
relation to consumption by the Huntly power
station and other existing North Island coal
consumers, including the Glenbrook steel mill,
there are extensive other resources in the
region which require market certainty to
convert to reserves.
The role of Huntly
Apart from co-generation use, New Zealand’s
only coal-fired power station is Genesis Power’s
1000 MW dual coal/gas station at Huntly, which
can supply up to 20% of New Zealand’s
electricity requirements. Its large size, and
capacity to switch fuels and set electricity
prices, mean that the station plays an impor-
tant role in thermal fuels and electricity
markets.
Since the Maui re-determination, and the
consequential gas shortage and higher prices,
Huntly has generated entirely on coal. This is
in contrast to previous years, when Huntly was
generally gas-fired at lower prices than coal.
Exacerbated by the hydro shortage in the
winter of 2003, Huntly used some 34 PJ of coal
in the year ending March 2004. This compares
with around 19 PJ in the previous year and less
than 10 PJ/year in some recent years prior to
that. Gas prices have risen to the extent that
Huntly, generating on coal at around 35%
thermal efficiency, has generally this year bid
ahead of gas-fired generation at Taranaki CC or
Otahuhu B, both about 50% thermally more
efficient than Huntly.
New coal mine opportunities
Almost 6000 PJ of known coal resources in the
Waikato region require further economic
viability analysis, but would presumably be
available at higher price levels. It seems likely
that coal from new mines in the Waikato would
find willing buyers at prices at or above the $3
to $3.50/GJ level, with a new power project the
likely key driver. Solid Energy estimate that at
a power price of 7c to 8c/kWh (excluding any
carbon tax), a 500 MW power station supplied
with Waikato (or conceivably imported) coal
could cover a fuel cost of between $2.60 and
$3.90/GJ depending on its location relative to
the upper North Island electricity loads. Mines
to supply such a power station would require
an additional annual output of over 1.5 million
tonnes, compared to the 2002 output of all
mines in the Waikato of 2.3 million tonnes.
There are extensive coal resources in other
regions, particularly Taranaki, the West Coast,
Otago and Southland. However, there are some
issues regarding location with respect to
energy loads and additional costs for transpor-
tation, either as coal to power stations and
other users, or as electricity if generated near
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the coalfields.
The critical path to commissioning new mines
would appear to be dominated by market
uncertainty, economic constraints and consent-
ing processes which provide the opportunity
for a wide variety of interests to be heard.
Mining and increased coal consumption seem
likely to draw objections from several environ-
mental angles, more so in the Waikato than in
the South Island or Taranaki.
Technological advances in the performance of
coal-fuelled electricity generation are resulting
in improved thermal efficiency and reduced
greenhouse gas emissions, and new capital
investments in New Zealand are likely to take
advantage of these features. Solid Energy has
established the commercial viability of a coal-
fired 150 MW power station in the Buller
region, where the company has substantial
reserves and mining competency. While a larger
power station would generate output in excess
of expected regional demand, a thermal power
station in Buller or anywhere else in the South
Island provides the South Island with much
needed fuel diversity in electricity generation,
thereby increasing security of supply in dry
years.
Under normal hydro flow, the abundance and
price-competitiveness of hydroelectricity east of
the South Island ranges weakens the commer-
cial viability of coal-fired generation close to
the voluminous and accessible Southland
lignite resource base.
In the longer term, the extensive low-rank coal
resources of the south-eastern South Island
will almost certainly be called upon as more
convenient energy sources are depleted and
new feedstocks are sought. The lignites offer
significant advantages over other coal types for
conversion to hydrogen and liquid fuels.
COMPRESSED NATURAL GAS (CNG)
New Zealand has considerable experience in
the small-scale supply and use of CNG that was
developed as an alternative fuels solution
following the oil crises of 1973 and 1979. CNG
use in motor vehicles was subsidised and CNG
usage peaked in 1985 at 5.85 PJ. With the
removal of subsidies, motor vehicle conver-
sions and consequential use of CNG declined
rapidly. The industry is now all but extinct and
much of New Zealand’s CNG expertise and
infrastructure has been lost. However, given
this history, the production, delivery and
handling of CNG would not likely present major
technological challenges.
The greatest challenge for large scale CNG
supply lies in the shipping segment of the
supply chain. Unlike LNG, where less than 20%
of the capital commitment is in the shipping
segment, it is estimated that this is around 80-
90% for CNG. The indicative capacity of CNG
tankers is around 0.7 PJ, around a quarter of
that of standard LNG tankers. While more
storage volume is required for the same energy
amount of CNG due to its lower density
compared to LNG, CNG processing is technically
simpler and therefore less expensive.
In contrast to LNG, the supply chain compo-
nents of CNG can be applied and are economic
on a smaller scale and are also more modular.
While economies-of-scale may exist within the
economic range for CNG, these seem likely to
be less severe than for LNG.
Our preliminary analysis for the New Zealand
segment of a CNG import scheme (the receiv-
ing, storage and decompression stages) uses
the same methodology as for the LNG investi-
gation. To facilitate comparison with the
importation of LNG, an import level of 80 PJ
has again been assumed. The following very
approximate costing for supply of CNG to New
Zealand indicates that potential per unit costs
are similar to those for the LNG regasification
vessel option.
Gas cost (on ship) US$1/GJ
Shipping US$2/GJ
NZ storage, etc US$1/GJ
Total US$4/GJ
However, the information base for the assess-
ment of a CNG scheme is much weaker than
for an LNG scheme, primarily because there
has yet to be any commercial applications of
large scale CNG production, shipping and
importation. There is no established interna-
tional market for CNG nor for the tankers, the
most capital intensive, least proven and most
important component of the supply chain. A
target of around 2010 for the first commercial
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application has been suggested.
While these issues should not preclude a
positive outcome, there are obvious risks with
being a first mover in a small and thin market.
Further investigation is suggested to determine
the potential of imported CNG to fill any gas
supply gap in the New Zealand thermal fuels
market.
COAL SEAM GAS
A thermal energy resource associated with
coalfields is coal-seam gas, which has been
developed to an increasing extent overseas,
notably in parts of the USA and in eastern
Australia. Until fairly recently, development of
coal-seam gas had been limited to coal
deposits that are higher rank than most New
Zealand resources. In the late 1990s, successful
development of coal-seam gas from low-rank
coals in the Powder River Basin in Wyoming
led to the realisation that, in favourable
circumstances, similar coal deposits might yield
commercial gas flows elsewhere.
Investigation of the potential of sub-bitumi-
nous coals in New Zealand dates back to the
late 1980s at Ohai in Southland, and most New
Zealand coal resources are currently under
investigation for coal-seam gas potential. It is
too early to determine the potential of this
resource.
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thermal fuel markets and economic impacts in the
post-Maui era
THERMAL FUEL MARKET CONTEXT
The New Zealand thermal fuels market is
characterised by its small size and lack of
diversity consequent on dominance by the
Maui field. Delivery of energy to New Zealand
consumers is achieved through a handful of
firms who typically own facilities for generating
or processing, aggregating, and contracting for
the transmission and distribution of energy in
its various forms to consumers. Barriers to
entry to bring in new supply are difficult, not
because of regulatory barriers, but because of
the small size of the New Zealand market
which creates its own element of risk.
These factors, amongst others, underscore the
peculiar features of the New Zealand energy
and thermal fuels markets that impacts on
fuels choices and supply arrangements. Firms
compete with each other both for energy
supplies (both from thermal and other sources)
and for customers, seeking to minimise cost
for the one and maximise revenue from the
other in order to generate the highest possible
profit. Successful business strategies create a
virtuous circle around a strong balance sheet
with lower-cost financing and (if listed) a
premium earnings multiple to share price.
Conversely, a misguided business strategy can
lead to rapid degradation of an energy
company’s standing, as for example struck
some participants in 2001 when wholesale
electricity prices exceeded retail prices over a
period, creating negative margins.
The status quo for energy supply in New
Zealand remains tuned to the Maui era, which,
as we have described, was characterised by an
inventory of proven developed natural gas
reserves that were large relative to the rate of
production. Although there has been consider-
able reform and market-driven adjustment
“downstream” of the producing fields, giving
the appearance of a vibrant and modern
energy market, the effects of the Maui Contract
have remained a dominant constraint on the
behaviour of the major firms in New Zealand’s
energy market. Successful firms have tailored
their business strategies around their particular
exposure to the Maui Contract. The key
features of the contract framework were:
• take-or-pay provisions that disincentivised
“banking” (conservation for potentially
higher value future use) of gas
• a low fixed price, progressively deteriorat-
ing in real terms while production and
competing energy costs have tended to
rise.
These features combined to stimulate Maui
production towards the end of the life of the
field. Eventually in late 2001, the producers
called time, leading to a protracted process to
rationalise the Maui arrangements, which has
really only come to fruition during 2004.
New Zealand now has an opportunity to
diversify its thermal fuel options. The key
distinction between the Maui era and the
present is that proven developed and undevel-
oped gas reserves are now low relative to the
rate of consumption. The gas situation is
providing incentives for additional upstream
activity in appraisal, exploration and develop-
ment. There has been a long-awaited upturn in
exploration and appraisal investment, and
some preliminary successes, beginning in 2003
and continuing this year.
However, exploration does not create certainty,
and major downstream uses of gas are having
to weigh the relative strategic merits of waiting
and hoping for restoration of an acceptable
inventory for which they can bid, or pre-
empting exploration results by turning to
alternative fuels, of which coal is pre-eminent.
Several have taken initiatives to stimulate gas
exploration investment directly as well as
indirectly.
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
The economic analysis in this study has three
main components. The first examines the effect
of developments in the markets for thermal
fuels on wholesale electricity prices, followed
by the macroeconomic implications of those
same developments. Finally, the strategic
issues associated with various fuel choices are
considered.
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4 Unless otherwise indicated, electricity analysis in this
study is based on average inflows into the hydro system.
5 SRMC is short-run marginal cost. It is the price at which a
plant will find it economic to produce. Thus SRMC covers
all short-term variable or controllable costs which may be
avoided if the marginal (last) unit is not produced. Short-
run marginal price may provide a contribution to fixed
costs or unavoidable costs but may not entirely cover
them.
6 LRMC is long-run marginal cost. SRMC cannot be above
LRMC. In the long-run, production must more than cover
both short-term variable costs and unavoidable fixed
costs, otherwise the return on the (plant) investment will
be insufficient to justify the investment (and provide
equity for replacement or future investment).
The electricity market
In order to assess the effects of changing
thermal fuels prices on electricity generation
and prices, we have used a plant-level model
of the electricity industry based on the same
logic as the wholesale electricity market. This
model is capable of replicating observed
market outcomes when the various New
Zealand generators offer into the wholesale
electricity market. The assumptions and model
structure are described in the detailed project
report. In this section, the implications of
different scenarios for the wholesale power
price are reported.
Base case
For the base case, the calculated electricity
price path is shown in Figure 94. It shows the
price based on SRMC5 in all periods; prices
rise and fall with new capacity injections,
dropping to low prices when large new thermal
plants are built. Figure 9 also shows the effect
on price of assuming a trend towards a price
ceiling based on LRMC6. A carbon tax of $15/t
CO2 is assumed to apply from 2008.
As a sensitivity case, Figure 10 shows the
impacts of wet and dry year assumptions on
price forecasts. Dry year hydro activity is based
on 2001 hydro inflows. Very high prices occur
in the initial years because of likely limited
spare capacity. Whirinaki is assumed to operate
at a significant load factor in many years, and
there is some demand response. The wet year
analysis is based on a 1995 hydro input
scenario.
Figure 10 shows that the current electricity
system is highly sensitive to dry year effects
with somewhat muted effects in wet years.
New capacity increments in future years
provides adequate generation capacity leading
to less sensitivity after about 2011, especially
in dry years.
These results illustrate the inadequate overall
capacity in the current system. While not a
focus of this study, the results also demon-
strate the importance of thermal fuels in the
New Zealand electricity market, especially for
the flexibility they provide.
LNG case
Figure 11 illustrates the impacts of LNG-based
gas prices on wholesale prices in an average
year and assuming LNG is introduced into the
market in 2011. The initial (2011) difference in
wholesale price between LNG and the base
case assumption is estimated at $12.75/MWh,
with an eventual $8.65 (11.4%) difference in
LRMC with rising indigenous gas prices.
The initial significant impact of LNG on electric-
ity prices is caused by two factors. One is the
increase in gas fuel price from $6.60/GJ for
indigenous natural gas to $8.70/GJ in 2011 for
LNG and the other is change in the merit order
of generation plants caused by higher gas
price. This latter effect is illustrated in Table 4
which shows the demand-weighted percentage
of time on the margin (i.e. setting price) for
several plants under different assumptions.
These figures are estimates of the percentage
of total generation supplied while specific
individual plants are on the margin. It is
notable that under the LNG scenario, Huntly
becomes more of a baseload plant and has a
correspondingly less significant role as a price
setting marginal plant.
At a gas price of $8.70/GJ, the older GCC plant
are the marginal plants. In other words, natural
gas provided by LNG may find it difficult to bid
successfully into the market. This would effect
a fundamental shift in electricity markets and
identifies a significant risk with LNG imports.
Coal case
An alternative scenario was run in which the
new thermal plant from 2011 are coal rather
than gas-fired. The results are shown for
different assumed carbon charges (Figure 12).
There is very little difference in wholesale price
between the coal case and the base case at
expected levels of carbon charges (i.e. $15/t
and $25/t). This exposes another significant
commercial risk for LNG, because coal can
always compete.
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Figure 9: Future wholesale electricity price path for the base case assuming average hydro
inflows and carbon charge of $15/t CO2 from 2008.
Figure 10: Wholesale electricity price projections—base case assumptions showing the impacts of wet and
dry year assumptions on price forecasts.
These modelling profiles for the various fuel
options are compared in Figure 13 for compa-
rable cases at a carbon charge of $15/t CO2
and the assumed study fuel prices. The main
implications of this electricity market modelling
are that the use of LNG as a fuel could result
in higher electricity prices than would occur if
coal was used to expand the thermal portfolio.
Extending this analysis to a carbon charge of
$25/t CO2 also gives a relative advantage to
coal over LNG. This advantage reduces at a
coal price of around $6/GJ whilst maintaining
LNG prices constant at the $8.70/GJ level.
These results show the importance of good
objective and transparent analysis, especially
of prices, in considering the thermal fuels
future for New Zealand.
Macroeconomic effects
An alternative way to study the impact of LNG
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Figure 11: Impacts of LNG-based gas prices on wholesale electricity price assuming average
hydro inflows and carbon charge of $15/t CO2 from 2008.
Load Factor (%) % of Generation with Plant onMargin
Plant Base Case LNG Case Base Case LNG Case
e3p (Gas) 89.0 62.3 3.3 13.7
OTAB (Gas) 80.5 35.5 8.9 40.1
TCC (Gas) 63.9 15.9 19.1 18.0
New CCGT 90.0 77.7 0 12.6
Huntly (Coal) 20.1 67.7 58.6 5.6
New Plymouth (Oil) 2.7 2.7 10.0 10.0
Table 4: Demand weighted marginal plant (2011) showing the effects of LNG on thermal fuels markets.
importation is through a general equilibrium
analysis. This mode of analysis is capable of
revealing the long-run changes in the economy
that would arise as a result of a sustained
change to the price of energy. This study
focused on the differences in the economy in
the target year ending March 2017 between the
base and LNG cases. As explained further in
the project report, it was assumed that several
key prices (wages, the cost of capital, the real
exchange rate and personal tax rates) would
adjust over time to ensure balanced fiscal and
external accounts and volumes of labour and
capital employed that were consistent with the
base case.
The LNG scenario was specified as involving:
• approximately 80PJ of LNG imported
• gas prices of $8.70/GJ, compared to $7.50
in the base case.
Under these assumptions, our modelling
predicted a change in the mix of imports rather
than the total level of imports, as in the long-
run, imports must balance with exports.
However since LNG imports are relatively
expensive, the terms of trade worsen, and
additional exports are needed to avoid an
external deficit.  Real exports rise by 0.4%,
pulling resources out of private consumption
which falls by 0.3% which is around $340m per
annum in 2004 prices. Taking account of
expected population growth, this implies a
reduction in real consumer spending power of
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Figure 12: Wholesale electricity price for new coal-fired plant showing the impact of various levels of
carbon tax and comparison with the base case.
about $77 per person per year, or an average
$220 per household.
The real cost of LNG imports in 2017 is
predicted to be $600m. Of this about $300m
is paid for by higher exports and lower private
consumption, leaving about $300m to be
accommodated by a change in the mix of
imports. Gas prices are 17% higher in the LNG
case as compared to the base case and
demand for both gas and electricity is lower.
An important caveat on this macroeconomic
analysis, based on a particular view of energy
prices, is that it effectively assumes that the
structure of the economy will not change
materially. In that sense, the LNG scenario
outcomes should be seen as a best case view
of the future. In particular, it does not envisage
any major changes to our industrial mix that
Figure 13: Comparison of wholesale electricity price for gas, coal and LNG.
Coal Case - $15/t Carbon
Base Case
Coal Case - no Carbon Cost
Coal Case - $25/t Carbon
x Base Case - $15/t Carbon
Base Case - no Carbon Cost
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1
LNG NZ-wide $8.70
Rising to $4/GJ by 2013; constant
thereafter2
Marsden $2.623 Constant
Southland $0.794 Constant
West Coast $1.205 Constant
Oil Whirinaki $156 Constant
New Plymouth $117 Constant
Coal Huntly $3.50 (2004)
1
 This study
2
MED (2004) New Zealand Energy Outlook to 2025
3
Solid Energy
4
Solid Energy
5
 Concept Consulting Group (2004) Project Aqua. An evaluation of the Economic Impact. Prepared for Ministry
6
 Concept Consulting Group (op cit)
7
 Concept Consulting Group (op cit)
of Economic Development
Fuel Location Price ($/GJ) Outlook—changes in real prices
Natural gas NZ-wide $5 Rising at 4% per annum until 2015
constant thereafter
Constant in real terms
Table 5: Comparison of thermal fuel prices
might affect the amount of productive capital
and/or labour in the economy, which would not
necessarily be the case.
STRATEGIC AND COMPETITIVE EFFECTS
This analysis indicates that LNG is a high cost
fuel relative to coal and to indigenous gas.
Table 5 above summarises our view of the
range of thermal fuel prices.
Given this, we consider that the commercial
viability of LNG importation is questionable at
present. The most obvious potential buyers of
LNG are electricity generators with combined
cycle gas plants. These firms would need to
consider the possibility of being uncompetitive
in the electricity market if their marginal costs
are too high. Set against this is the risk of
having to adjust their management strategies
for existing assets in the event that indigenous
gas is not available.
Provided this remains a purely commercial
decision, we have no real concerns. This would
be fully consistent with the development of
competitive markets for electricity generation.
It is nevertheless worth considering how a
public policy analysis of this decision might
proceed. Imagine for a moment that the
generation industry was centrally planned but
that we relied upon competitive markets to
supply fuels. In this case, a decision over LNG
importation would need to trade-off two
important factors: the incentives for indigenous
exploration, and the value of fuel certainty.
In our view, the effect of LNG importation on
the New Zealand gas exploration and produc-
tion sector would be negative, primarily for
scale reasons. Importing 80 PJ of LNG per
annum would supply about half of likely
demand. The most likely contract structure
would involve a long-term commitment to this
volume of gas, reducing the size of market
available to indigenous suppliers. This would
severely limit the range of commercially viable
field sizes and deter exploration.
On the other hand, no-one can be sure that
sufficient gas will be found and developed in
time to bridge the emerging fuels gap, so our
“generation planner” certainly needs a fall-back
strategy. We would encourage this hypothetical
planner to consider the full range of options
that are available before committing to an LNG
solution. Our investigations show that those
involved in the delivery of energy services to
New Zealand are beginning to offer alternatives
for meeting this country’s future thermal fuel
requirements. Overstating the risk to supply
could result in less preferred outcomes.
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discussion
During the course of its investigations into New
Zealand’s energy future, CAE has sought to
address this balance question through a careful
examination and objective analysis of the
primary technical, commercial and economic
factors that characterise the New Zealand
thermal fuels market. Our purpose has been to
understand the likely ramifications of choosing
any one option for meeting future energy
needs, and thus develop a picture of the
preferred transition pathway from our previous
reliance on Maui gas to a sustainable energy
future.
THE THERMAL FUELS MARKET
The studies contributing to the investigation
have been important in allowing better
definition of the current state of the New
Zealand thermal fuels market and the likely
contributions that can be expected from the
various supply side options evaluated.
In summary, several important points can be
made:
• The inherent difficulty faced by the New
Zealand energy market is one of small
scale, and the high risk hurdles to be
overcome before new production capacity
can be made available to the market.
• The quest for economies of scale within
this small market has resulted in heavy
reliance over a long period on a single
dominant energy source, so that competi-
tive pressures have been dormant during
an extended interval.
• As a consequence, the market had become
glutted with excess capacity pre-sold,
leaving little room for new supply. This
reinforced a bias towards oil prospects in
the exploration sector, which has been
operating at sub-critical mass. Accordingly,
there has been little infrastructure develop-
ment to support an ordered transition from
Maui to a post-Maui future.
• With gas scarcity has come more market-
reflective prices, which in turn has created
positive incentives for exploration. There is
now a window of time within which the
various alternatives can be considered
before serious risk of significant shortages
arises.
• The importance of diversity of energy
supply on security needs to be underlined.
The consequence of foreclosing options at
this early stage in the post-Maui transition
would have the inevitable effect of reducing
diversity.
• The indigenous gas reserves inventory of
around 2000 PJ is unsatisfactory, resulting
in strong competition for future production
offers.
• There is significant potential for further
indigenous gas resources, and there are
very large coal resources already estab-
lished. Indications from this study are that
future pricing is likely to support their
development.
These circumstances set the platform for
considering future thermal fuel options for New
Zealand.
INDIGENOUS GAS
Our examination of the supply security issue
suggests that if New Zealand were to simply
rely on indigenous gas from existing developed
fields and those known and in development
then we are likely to see a gas shortfall
occurring at some time early in the next
decade.
However, this is not a realistic picture for
considering New Zealand’s gas prospectivity.
The fundamentals for further discovery in the
Taranaki Basin are strong and given a reason-
able level of exploration, combined with
appropriate market opportunity, then there is a
good likelihood that inventories can be
extended sufficiently to meet requirements out
to early in the next decade, the exact time
depending on what demand assumptions are
used. Beyond this, there is opportunity for
significant further discovery in some other
basins as well.
With aggressive exploration activity that
extends into other regions, a plausible scenario
can be presented that could result in a
significantly enhanced gas reserves inventory. A
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considered view on New Zealand’s gas
prospectivity suggests scope for a strongly
emerging gas market in the future, potentially
restored to levels of the Maui era, albeit with
higher producer prices.
LNG
The counterfactual to this proposition, is that
the risk that sufficient new discoveries will not
be forthcoming is too great for the New
Zealand economy to bear and thus a preferred
option is the importation of substitute fuels, or
greater use of coal for thermal use. In this
scenario, LNG is considered as the substitution
option. This does not imply that other thermal
fuels are less likely options, but simply reflects
the fact that imported gas is in the most direct
competition with indigenous gas.
Excluding in-country infrastructure costs the
price components of an imported LNG supply
are; the ex-liquefaction (FoB) gas price in the
country of origin, the shipping cost to New
Zealand, and the storage and regasification
costs in New Zealand. The analysis reported in
this study suggests that the “New Zealand”
component of this final supply cost (producer
basis ex the regasification plant) is likely to be
of the order of 17-20% of the total delivered
price. In other words, from a pricing perspec-
tive, supply-side risk resides essentially
offshore.
Analysis of world markets indicates that LNG is
a large-scale capital-intensive industry reliant
on an integrated supply chain that is character-
ised by transfer pricing arrangements and
sophisticated sales agreements to mitigate
production, transport and commercial risks.
There is thus likely to be significant risk in any
contractual arrangement that significantly
differs from conventional supply arrangements.
These arrangements are typified by long-term
supplier contracts and pricing formulas linked
to the price of crude oil.
It is also apparent that the market is evolving.
Contractual arrangements and pricing mecha-
nisms are becoming more diversified so as to
more closely reflect the circumstance of the
buyer; regional price differentiations are
narrowing; and shipping costs are falling,
driven in part by increasing scale of the
operations and the individual volumes traded.
The question that thus arises is what place in a
world market has a small-scale New Zealand
facility located at the edge of the Pacific and
away from the major trade routes? These
vulnerabilities have not been considered here
but it seems reasonable to expect that they
will eventually drive the commercial risks of a
venture, rather than the New Zealand invest-
ment cost of the local regasification facility.
The starting point for applying an LNG scenario
to New Zealand is a conventional land-based
receiving and storage terminal and
regasification plant. Study estimates, based on
$US 30/bbl crude oil and NZ$0.55/US$1,
indicates a delivered gas price of around
$8.70/GJ for a 80PJ/year facility, and before the
gas enters the transmission and distribution
system. At this level of production there would
be few economies of scale.
More importantly from a New Zealand perspec-
tive, is the influence that commitments to a
long-term supply contract for somewhere
between 50-65% of New Zealand’s total gas
demand might have on the residual gas
market, and the subsequent outcomes for
buyers and sellers.
ALTERNATIVE THERMAL FUELS
Competition for the discovery and development
of new indigenous gas resources and competi-
tion for the supply of gas from all sources
needs to be considered as part of any decision
to import LNG into the New Zealand market.
Between the security advantage of imported
LNG and the competitive advantage of hoped-
for discovery and development of indigenous
natural gas, there is a range of alternatives
that could combine to give more optimal
solutions or preferred outcomes. These options
include:
• coal, either imported or indigenous
• smaller scale imported LNG based on a
floating gasification facility
• imported Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG)
• imported Compressed Natural Gas (CNG)
• imported liquid fuels and their derivatives
such as naphtha.
The various options have been summarily
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explored in this study and we conclude that
whilst coal seam gas, liquid fuels and LPG, in
particular, could increase their market share in
some niche applications they are unlikely to be
significant additional contributors to the
thermal fuels market in this country14.
Coal, however, offers significant flexibility for a
market place that is already constrained by
seasonal demand profiles and dry-year effects
within the electricity segment of the market.
There are abundant resources of suitable coal
for expansion for direct use and electricity
generation in several regions, especially the
Waikato and on the West Coast of the South
Island. The extensive low-rank coal resources
of the south-eastern South Island are less
favourably located with respect to major load
centres and their development is more likely to
be focussed around future opportunities for
chemical and liquid fuels production to meet
New Zealand’s emerging demand for a sustain-
able primary fuels base.
In respect of CNG, its greatest challenge lies in
the shipping segment of the supply chain with
approximately 80% of the total supply cost
tied-up in the shipment of the fuel. On the
other hand, CNG offers the advantages of
modularity and flexibility. Implementation of
this option would require much greater under-
standing of the technical and supply risks.
The impact of an LNG project on the size of the
gas market is thus of considerable importance.
The component of this market that needs to be
considered is the volume of demand that could
be served by an indigenous producer, since
this is what feeds into such a firm’s investment
analysis. This market will be reduced by low-
usage costs for potential substitute fuels such
as coal and CNG. It will also be reduced by the
pre-existence of long-term contracts for gas
supply from existing producers, since the
volume of gas covered by such contracts is not
contestable for a new supplier.
ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF LNG IMPORTATION
In this study we conservatively estimate that
the core demand for natural gas in New
Zealand today is around 110  PJ a year, with
additions of about 20 PJ every three years as
new power stations are required to meet
growth in electricity demand. It would seem
unlikely, therefore, that an LNG project at the
assumed 80 PJ/year threshold scale could
proceed in the New Zealand context without
significant adverse competition effects.
Beyond this consideration is the additional
factor of the likely requirement for long-term
contracts for LNG, as this will have the largest
potential impact on the size of the contestable
gas market. LNG importation would not be a
risk-free project. The primary risk is that the
delivered cost of gas imported as LNG is
materially higher than the projected average
delivered cost of indigenous gas, or becomes
so during the anticipated life of the contract.
If this situation transpires, some or all of the
sunk capital invested in the LNG project could
potentially be stranded. Whether such strand-
ing would actually occur would depend on the
structure of the contract that underlies the
importation of the fuel, and any in-country
arrangements for on-selling the gas.
Consideration of the range of contractual
arrangements that might manage this risk is
beyond the scope of the study. Instead,
analysis was undertaken of the relative costs
of electricity derived from a business as usual
case, which allowed for natural gas discovery
and development as well as inter-fuel substitu-
tion by coal, against an LNG import case. This
analysis allows some estimate to be made of
the likely vulnerability of an LNG project of
being exposed to import prices greater than
the alternatives.
Our preliminary analysis of the different
scenarios suggests that an LNG price is likely
to be 15-20% higher than indigenous gas by
the year 2017. This price premium, if forced
onto the electricity generator, will translate into
increased electricity costs of around $3.50/
MWh in LRMC and a reduced demand from
substitution and destruction of low-value
electricity load.
14 This assumption ignores the potential for significant
increased penetration of LPG into the automotive fuel
market to assist in meeting greenhouse gas limits on that
market.
Page 40 Energy Supply in the Post-Maui Era
The implications of these effects have been
further analysed through the use of general
equilibrium modelling of the New Zealand
economy. The main effect of the demand for
imported LNG is to change the mix of imports
rather than the total level of imports. This in
turn impacts adversely on terms of trade,
implying that exports will need to rise to pay
for the increased costs. Exports are likely to
rise by about 0.4% in value resulting in a fall
in private consumption of about 0.3%. This
effect is equivalent to a net reduction in
household spending of about an average of
$220 per household. At the limit assumption,
where LNG meets the entire thermal fuels
market, the reduction in private spending falls
to about $290 per household per year.
In addition to these impacts, an increase in the
price of gas will have a direct impact on major
energy users. The critical issue for these users
is the pricing level at which there is no new
investment, but with operations continuing at
plants with sunk costs, and at which variable
costs cannot be covered and operations cease.
This situation has already emerged, e.g.
operations at the Methanex methanol plants in
Taranaki have dropped to less than half of
capacity and are forecast to drop further next
year. The impacts of such closures are several
fold:
• reduction of the total demand for gas in
New Zealand, thereby reducing the incen-
tives for further exploration
• loss of the capacity to use large-scale loads
as a swing element to optimise gas field
production management and (for example)
moderate seasonal demand effects for
electricity generation
• reduction of asset values for New Zealand’s
primary sectors (forest, mineral and
farming), as well as manufacturing itself,
because of the impact of higher costs on
profitability.
Based on this analysis, assessment of future
fuel options should be particularly concerned
with a situation in which the delivered cost of
LNG exceeds the expected prices of indigenous
gas or other alternatives.
The position of a potential LNG buyer, such as
a thermal electricity generator committing to
buy LNG at a price in excess of the price of
locally produced gas, is that it risks being
unable to secure economic dispatch in the
electricity market as a result of competition
from rivals using indigenous gas. This risk
seems unlikely to be willingly shouldered by
any generator acting alone.
An obvious risk mitigation strategy would be
to form a joint venture of all gas-fired electric-
ity generators (or at least a dominant sub-set
of ) for the purpose of buying LNG. Such a joint
venture would actually be able to contract for
LNG at a price in excess of indigenous gas cost
without fear of competition from generators
using local gas. It is difficult to imagine that
such an arrangement would be authorised by
the Commerce Commission. However, if this
situation did materialise, the incentives for
local exploration and development would be
materially reduced as a result of the removal of
a large pool of previously contestable gas
customers.
Clearly, if a fully commercial case can be made
for LNG then it will go ahead. If not, then there
are a number of possibilities that might arise.
One is that Government might commit to LNG
for energy security reasons, either directly or
by underwriting a commercial investment. If
this option were to be pursued then the issue
becomes one of public policy and will presum-
ably require extensive consultation and
dialogue with industry players and consumer
advocacy groups.
Current energy policy framing does not readily
allow for coherent attention to this issue, in
spite of evidence of the necessity for interven-
tion in other areas of the energy market. The
lack of a coherent view in this country on our
preferred future pathways suggest the way
ahead will be fraught with difficulty.
OPTIMAL THERMAL FUEL STRATEGIES
Commitment to an LNG-secured pathway
ignores the range of other possibilities for
meeting future demand. As well as further
development of coal, and discovery and
development of indigenous gas, technical
options for future supply include an LNG
regasification vessel, and CNG. Competition
between these options, whilst offering the
potential for reduced long run energy prices,
will most likely result in greater volatility of
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prices. In this hybrid supply case, an LNG
import component can be envisaged based
around a developed physical infrastructure
supported by Government investment, with gas
supply contracts open to generators and
producers alike.
Opening New Zealand to a spot market for
thermal fuel has the potential to incentivise
least-cost solutions whilst also managing long-
term supply risk. If the world price for LNG,
LPG, CNG or coal was very low one might
expect that the development and production of
indigenous resources would be throttled back.
At times of high international prices local
production would have an advantage and
import facilities would be less extensively
used.
The main conclusion from this analysis is
therefore that security does not necessarily
require that our economy become locked into
any one single option. The importation of LNG,
whilst superficially attractive from a security of
supply perspective, raises significant public
policy issues and needs to be closely examined
from a national economic perspective.
Other alternatives are available and, on
balance, current energy inventories are likely to
be able to meet future needs out to early in
the next decade. Indigenous natural gas supply
is potentially manageable now that a large
tranche of consumption, in the region of 60-90
PJ/year, has been attrited due to both
deliverability and price factors. Continuing
sufficiency is conditional on undeveloped
reserves in the Pohokura and Kupe fields being
developed according to plan, and new discov-
eries being made soon and brought on stream
promptly.
A premature decision to import LNG would act
to discourage local gas exploration and coal
development and thus inevitably lead New
Zealand to a future of high energy cost and
constrained economic growth.
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conclusion
This is the first independent study to bring to
public attention the issues surrounding the
need to achieve energy security in this country,
and the policy and strategic reference frames in
which key decisions will need to be taken in
the transition from the depletion of the Maui
gas field.
The investigations covered in this report are
far-reaching. While it has not been possible
with the resources available to the study team
to cover all the various issues in depth, we
have sought to bring together the key ele-
ments that will be important in framing future
decisions on meeting New Zealand’s future
thermal fuel requirements, and the choices we
might have.
The most obvious conclusion is that there are
significant uncertainties surrounding forward
projections of demand and the likely conse-
quence of any adopted strategy. Foremost
amongst these uncertainties are issues sur-
rounding:
• The complex amalgam of transactions that
currently define our thermal fuels market,
and the likely future behaviours of the
major and potentially dominant players.
• The relationship between fuel price and
demand, contractual structures and the
likely responses of major consumers with
regard to fuel substitution and demand
shedding.
• Industry views as to what constitutes
adequate strategic energy reserves.
• The likely response to rising gas prices by
the exploration sector.
• The market dynamics that could improve
prospects for developing some of New
Zealand’s underdeveloped and in some
cases undiscovered energy resources.
• The potential economic effects from the
imposition of the carbon tax and how this
might ultimately influence the competitive
position of gas versus coal and other
options.
• The likely implications to the New Zealand
economy and its international competitive-
ness from a change in the volumes and mix
of fuel imports.
• Modelling approaches that can accurately
describe future electricity wholesale
process.
• The economic value to the New Zealand
economy of diversity of energy supply.
These factors, and the myriad of second order
effects, will actually determine the ultimate
outcome for New Zealand. Our understanding
of them is thus critical to arriving at decisions
which lead to an optimal energy supply
strategy for this country. In this study we have
attempted to develop and explore these issues
so that their relative importance and influence
can be evaluated.
What we have discovered is that there is little
hard evidence to support many of the influ-
ences identified. Instead we have been forced
to rely in many instances on anecdotal evi-
dence in bringing together our thinking and
judgements. Where it has been possible to
bring together quantitative analysis we have
done so to a first order level. More needs to
be done.
Whilst some of this work will undoubtedly be
undertaken at an enterprise level as a normal
part of in-house strategic planning, the
difficulty for New Zealand is that such analysis
does not generally reside in the public arena. If
it is presented in public reports, the work is
not robustly debated or thoroughly examined
from a public policy perspective.
The challenge for New Zealand is to balance
security, risk, economic competitiveness and
the value of fuels diversity. The key questions
for New Zealand are:
• what constitutes an adequate strategic
reserve capability sufficient to facilitate the
ordered and sustainable development of
our thermal fuels market, and
• what contribution to this market might be
made from indigenous fuel sources.
At one end of the energy security scale,
certainty of supply can be achieved by invest-
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ing in “gold-plated” solutions that might
guarantee supply but at the expense of overall
economic efficiency. At the other end of the
scale we can adopt a laise faire approach,
accepting higher supply risk in return for
hoped-for advantage in lower energy costs and
improved competitiveness. The optimal balance
lies somewhere between these two extremes.
We argue that to arrive at this balance point,
there is a need to have a much clearer view of
the implications of different supply options and
the public policy imperatives that would
underpin any commercial undertaking in
support of any the alternative pathways
identified in this report.
This study has crystallised several knowledge
keystones within which the options and public
policy imperatives can be considered:
• The inherent difficulty faced by the New
Zealand energy market is one of scale. In a
small market the likelihood for market
dominance is high, and the competition
effects of any future option need to be
explicitly addressed in ways that are
transparent to the market as a whole while
allowing for competitive outcomes.
• The fundamentals for further gas explora-
tion success are good and with a higher
level of exploration activity there are good
prospects for restoring New Zealand’s gas
inventory to a level that would improve
energy supply security and give energy
markets a higher level of certainty.
• New Zealand thus has a window of oppor-
tunity available to it of some few years
before any decision needs to be made on
the next tranche of fuel supply. A premature
decision to import LNG would act to
discourage local gas exploration and
possibly coal development and would lead
the country to a future of high energy cost
and diminished economic performance.
There are alternatives deserving of more
attention.
• For major energy users the price of gas will
be critical. Demand destruction within the
petrochemicals and primary industry
sectors reduces New Zealand gas demand
and thus the incentives for exploration.
Higher costs will also adversely impact on
the competitiveness of the primary produc-
tion and processing sectors and hence on
the economy as a whole.
Security of energy supply in the post-Maui era
does not require our economy to lock into any
one thermal fuel option. Dealing with supply
shortfall is not simply a question of reducing
risk at any price or seeking certainty; instead,
it demands responses that will extend our
primary energy resource base, restore invento-
ries to cover a strategic reserve capacity and
enable long-term investment in alternative
sources.
But perhaps most importantly, this study
reinforces the view that, because of New
Zealand’s small energy markets and the
impediments to investment in upstream
activity, we are unlikely to ever see a purely
commercial decision related to future supply
infrastructure. In this environment, the choice
to import fuels raises significant public policy
and economic issues. Analysis of these issues
remains a vital component of future energy
planning in this country.
No matter what path we go down, we need to
avoid over-dependence on a single option.
Commercial proposals should be required to
look at the full range of options and public
policy must examine the trade-offs between
encouraging indigenous thermal fuel develop-
ment and the risks associated with striving for
fuel certainty.
Ultimately the challenge for New Zealand is to
balance security, risk, economic competitive-
ness, environmental outcomes, and the value
of fuels diversity so as to deliver the best
macro-economic outcome for New Zealand.
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